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Abstract 
In this research I attempt to model and investigate the housing decisions of 
Spanish-speaking migrants.    I use methods developed by Bajari and Kahn (2002) to 
obtain willingness to pay measurements for the migrant groups in samples drawn from 
three major California cities.  I then apply these results to several hypotheses that attempt 
to describe current migration patterns of Hispanics into increasingly segregated 
communities characterized by high levels of crowding, low educational attainment, and 
high levels of Spanish speakers.  This research finds that spoken language plays a 
significant role in a migrant’s decision process.   Spanish-speaking migrants demonstrate 
a significant preference for locating in communities with higher levels of Spanish 
speakers.  They demonstrate a large relative distaste for living neighborhoods with high 
levels of human capital – as measured by the percentage of college graduates, as well as 
significantly lower valuations for the amount of space in a housing unit – measured by the 
number of rooms.  The spatial assimilation hypothesis finds significant support within the 
results, indicating that more assimilated Spanish speakers will continue to emigrate from 
language enclaves.  These results will offer insights into the creation and growth of 
Hispanic language enclaves in the U.S.     
 
 
*The author would like to thank Professor Patrick Bajari for his continuous support and understanding 
through this process.  Professor Mark Tendall also provided valuable comments.  All remaining errors in 
this research are my own. 
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  I. Introduction  
Census 2000 saw the emergence of the Hispanics as the dominant minority group 
with a population of 35,305,818 (12.5% of total population).  This change speaks of the 
impressive growth exhibited by the Hispanic population between 1990 and 2000.  In 1990, 
they represented only 22,354,059 or 9% of the total population.  Why is this significant?  
In a single decade, Hispanics grew as a population by a whopping 13,000,000 people, 
representing a population percentage increase of 58%!  More interesting perhaps, is the 
question of where this growth is focused.  Census data indicates that the Hispanic 
population is highly concentrated in California, along the Texas-Mexico border, in Florida 
and New York.  Hispanics, as a population, demonstrate a tendency to cluster together, 
live in more crowded conditions, and reside in neighborhoods characterized by low-levels 
of education.  These observations seem to imply that Hispanics have a unique set of 
preferences that, combined with other factors, yield the observed concentrations of 
Hispanics in Western central cities.1   
In order to better understand why Hispanics are choosing to cluster together it is 
necessary to present a model of housing demand.  In this research, I implement a flexible 
model of housing demand described and tested in Bajari and Khan (2002).  This model 
will allow for the recovery of individual taste parameters for housing characteristics such 
as the amount of space and types of neighborhoods in which they are located.  I estimate 
this model for three individual Metropolitan Statistical Areas within Southern California, 
chosen for their observed concentrations of Hispanics.  These individual taste parameters 
can then be regressed across demographics to yield the joint distribution of tastes and 
demographics.  This exercise encourages a broader understanding of how individual level 
demographics can affect tastes.  The empirical results will enable the testing of several 
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hypotheses that attempt to explain location patterns and preferences of Hispanic migrants.  
These hypotheses will focus on the preferences of Spanish-speaking migrants and attempt 
to explain their tastes for housing and neighborhood characteristics, as well as offer 
insights as to how these tastes change across demographics within this group.             
The rapid creation and growth of highly concentrated Spanish language enclaves, 
often called “barrios”, is inspiring concern over the effects of such neighborhoods on their 
inhabitants.  An example of such clustering can be observed in Santa Ana, California.  
Santa Ana is the largest city in Orange County, with a population of 337,977 in 2000 that 
is comprised of 76.1% Hispanics.  Nearly 180,000 or 53.3% are foreign-born and of these, 
153,000 were from Latin America.  One can also see how spoken language may be vital in 
explaining Hispanic preferences.  Out of the population five years of age and over, 
211,000 residents speak Spanish and of those, 138,000 speak English less than “very 
well.”  The average household size in Santa Ana is 4.55 – one of the highest in the nation! 
This compares to a statewide average of 2.87 and a national average of 2.59.   Crowding is 
also a huge issue in Santa Ana as over 50.3% of residents live in “crowded” conditions 
and 36.9% live in “severely crowded” conditions.2  Another key characteristic is the level 
education, or lack thereof.  More than 56.8% of the population over 25 years have less 
than a high school degree and only 9.2% have attained a bachelor’s degree or higher.3  
While Santa Ana is a somewhat extreme example of an immigrant community, it 
highlights several key issues that may provide us with insights into the Hispanic housing 
decision as well as problems that may arise due to heavy concentrations of Spanish 
speakers and recent immigrants.   
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Economic and Sociological studies have been attempting to describe the effects of 
racial segregation on communities and cities since John F. Kain proposed that racial 
segregation in housing markets had adverse effects on black employment in 1968.4  In its 
strict form, Kain’s spatial mismatch hypothesis states that blacks are subject to adverse 
employment outcomes due to housing segregation which in turn reduces employment 
information and increases transportation costs.  In an analysis of the effects of ghettos on 
blacks, Cutler and Glaeser (1995) find that in racially segregated cities, blacks have lower 
high school graduation rates, and higher levels of unemployment coupled with lower 
overall incomes.  Contrastingly, there exists a smaller body of literature that points out 
positive effects of racial segregation.  Wilson (1987) argues that decreased racial 
segregation leads to increased segregation by education and income.  In effect, wealthier 
and more highly educated blacks will emigrate from ghettos given free mobility – thus 
reducing the presence of positive role models for segregated blacks.                 
While there is a substantial literature on the spatial separation of blacks and whites 
within inner cities, the literature on Hispanic populations, especially given their 
significance and demonstrated growth patterns, is not as extensive.  Importantly, the 
black-white case may not directly apply to that of Hispanics - especially given the 
prevalence of immigrants within the Hispanic populace (38% in 2000).  Krivo (1995), 
finds that immigration plays a key role in explaining relatively low levels of 
homeownership and high household crowding for each of four large Hispanic populations 
(Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, Cubans, and other Hispanics).  According to Krivo, the 
analysis frequently implemented in the black-white model doesn’t take into account 
variables that are uniquely responsible for explaining the social position of immigrant-
origin populations. Take, for example, the role of language.  Within the Hispanic 
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community, where conversations and transactions are frequently carried out in Spanish 
rather than English, language becomes a key variable.   
In this research I focus on the housing decisions of Spanish-speaking migrants in 
order to test hypotheses that attempt to explain the observed characteristics of Hispanic 
communities.  Previous work on immigration and the effects of English language 
proficiency on wage rates motivate the choice of language as a sorting variable.  Chiswick 
and Miller (1995) find that the effect of English fluency for immigrants within the United 
States is a 16.9% higher wage earnings rate.5  These findings of a positive effect of 
English fluency on wage rates are echoed by McManus (1985) in a study of Hispanic 
wages.  McManus estimated that in 1980, the present value of not acquiring fluency for 
non-English-fluent Hispanic males to be a cost of $36,000.  Additionally, Chiswick and 
Miller report that minority-language enclaves have a greater depressing effect on 
destination language fluency among immigrants with the lowest levels of fluency - those 
who have recently arrived, are less well educated, and who immigrate at an older age.  
Given the findings above, one would expect Spanish-speaking migrants to avoid locating 
in communities with high concentrations of Spanish speakers in order to speed 
assimilation.  This leads us to our first hypothesis.   
Hypothesis 1:  Spanish-speaking migrants will seek to avoid communities with high 
levels of Spanish-speakers in order to speed the assimilation process. 
 
However, a substantial body of immigration literature describes communities with 
large minority populations as networks that reduce the cost of migration for new 
immigrants by providing employment, shelter, and protection.  Massey et al. (1993) define 
migrant networks as “sets of interpersonal ties that connect migrants, former migrants and 
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non migrants in origin and destination areas through ties of kinship, friendship, and shared 
community origin.”6  In an investigation of the effects of language enclaves on Hispanics, 
McManus (1990) finds that large enclaves lower the earnings return to English fluency 
and provide better jobs for persons lacking skills in English.  Lazear (1999) presents a 
model of sorting, in which individuals who are not fluent in the majority language seek 
out communities in which their native language is spoken in order to facilitate trade.  
Lazear describes every interaction among individuals who share the same language as 
resulting in a trade and notes that if an individual is located in a society where few share 
his or her language, they will be forced to assimilate - else they will receive no gains from 
trade.  Therefore, the size of the minority language group within a community is critical; if 
the minority language group is large enough, members can avoid absorbing the costs of 
assimilating towards the dominant group.  These studies motivate the alternative 
hypothesis that Spanish-speaking migrants will demonstrate a preference for communities 
with high levels of Spanish speakers. 
Hypothesis 2:  Spanish-speaking migrants choose to locate in communities with high 
levels of Spanish-speakers to receive positive network effects, lower transaction costs, 
and better employment opportunities. 
 
Hypotheses (1-2) deal directly with the question of whether Spanish-speaking 
migrants prefer to live in communities characterized by high levels of Spanish speakers.  
Another significant characteristic of language enclaves such as Santa Ana is the presence 
of extremely low levels of education.  A study by Grenier (1984), finds that Hispanic 
males whose mother tongue is Spanish have lower returns to education than Hispanics 
whose mother tongue is English.  Grenier’s analysis indicates that Spanish-speaking 
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migrants will place lower importance on the education levels present within communities.  
Lazear’s framework predicts that Spanish speakers will gain significantly less from being 
surrounded by highly educated individuals than non-Spanish speakers.  This derives from 
the fact that in the model, individuals must share the same language to facilitate trade – 
hence a Spanish speaker gains little from being surrounded by highly educated individuals 
(assuming that the majority of college graduates speak English).  The lower returns to 
education for Spanish speakers combined with their inability to accrue gains from 
interacting with highly educated neighbors, motivates Hypothesis 3.          
Hypothesis 3:  Spanish-speaking migrants will place a lower valuation on the level 
of education present within a community.  
 
Examining the neighborhood preferences of Spanish-speaking migrants will offer 
insights into their decision process, however the choice of housing is multifaceted.   To 
understand the housing preferences of this migrant group we need to know how they value 
different physical housing attributes as well as aspects such as ownership and 
city/suburban residence.  In order to interpret these measures and create a framework from 
which one can draw conclusions regarding Spanish speakers’ housing preferences I draw 
from the spatial assimilation model.7  Spatial assimilation theory argues that a large part 
of the process of socioeconomic advancement for minorities can be related to the 
integration with mainstream society through residential location.  It points out that many 
aspects of individual life are directly related to where one is located, including the quality 
of education, social status, exposure to crime, and access to employment.  The theory 
predicts the integration of minorities into neighborhoods that reflect their level of 
assimilation and economic status.  Thus, we will examine the preferences of Spanish-
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speaking migrants for a wide variety of housing and neighborhood characteristics, 
controlling for various measures of assimilation, in an effort to explain certain aspects 
prevalent in Spanish-language enclaves.  In this process we will be able to test the 
viability of the spatial assimilation model within a willingness to pay framework.  
Hypothesis 4:  Spanish-speaking migrants with higher household incomes and 
education levels, who are further along in the life cycle, will possess higher valuations 
of those attributes that reflect elevated socioeconomic status. 
 
In this research, I extract individual willingness to pay measurements for certain 
neighborhood and housing characteristics.  These measurements will allow me to test 
Hypotheses (1-4).  Results of these tests will offer insights into the rapid transformation of 
many cities with high levels of Hispanic migration.  I describe the data used in my 
empirical tests in Section 2.  In Section 3, I specify a model for the migrant’s utility 
function and describe the vector of demographics that enter into my estimation.  I present 
my results in Section 4 and discuss their significance in relation to my proposed 
hypotheses as well as future migration patterns.  Section 5 concludes. 
 
II. The Data  
 
The data was drawn from the 1990 Census of Population and Housing Integrated 
Public Use Microdata 1% metropolitan sample.  In this paper, I focus on large 
metropolitan areas within Southern California as they posses high levels of Hispanic 
migration as well as pre-existing Hispanic communities.8  I selected three metropolitan 
statistical areas (MSA’s) from which to draw my observations: Los Angeles – Long Beach 
MSA, Anaheim – Santa Ana –Garden Grove MSA, and the San Diego MSA.  I treat each 
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of the three MSA’s as unique data sets and run separate regressions and empirical tests on 
each MSA.   
In my samples, I begin by evaluating the entire sample populations for each 
individual MSA.  I use Public Use Microdata Areas (PUMAs) to geographically divide 
each MSA.  PUMAs are used to divide MSA’s over 200,000 people into 100,000+ person 
geographic units.9  For each PUMA, I can then calculate PUMA specific neighborhood 
attributes such as the percent of college graduates or the percent of Spanish speakers.  
Next, I identify the family household heads within the data to generate the descriptive 
statistics for each MSA. 
Table 1 lists the summary statistics for both the overall and migrant population 
household heads within the Los Angeles –Long Beach, Anaheim-Santa Ana-Garden 
Grove, and San Diego MSA’s.  I choose to separate the populations and migrant groups 
by the ability to speak Spanish.  By isolating both the Spanish-speaking and non-
Spanish speaking segments one can see the demographic differences between the two 
populations.  I focus on recent migrants in the empirical work that follows due to the 
fact that households that migrate are more likely to be consuming their optimal housing 
bundle.  This derives from the concept that non-migrant households might have been 
deterred from moving and consuming their optimal housing bundle by high transaction 
costs associated with relocation.  Therefore, I describe migrant households as 
households that have moved during the previous five years.      
Spanish-speaking household heads within the sample are characterized by low 
levels of college graduation, lower incomes, large household sizes, and are more 
predominantly male than their non-Spanish-speaking counterparts.  Both sets of 
migrants on average possess lower incomes, are younger, and are less likely to be 
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married than non-migrants.  The household sizes of Spanish-speaking household heads 
are at least one and a half times larger than those of non-Spanish-speaking households.  
Spanish-speaking household heads are also 3-5 times less likely to possess college 
degrees.  It is important to note that the yearly income differential between Spanish-
speaking and non-Spanish-speaking migrants ranges from $16,700 in the LA-Long 
Beach MSA to $11,700 in the San Diego MSA.   
I create random samples of 2000 migrants for each MSA.  I will use these 
samples in the estimation of the model described in the following section.  The summary 
statistics for the samples are listed in Table 2.  The statistics in Table 2 are consistent 
with the descriptive data presented on the overall migrant populations.  However, it is 
important to note that on average Spanish-speaking migrants live in communities with 
two times the number of Spanish speakers than non-Spanish-speaking migrants and are 
half as likely to own their homes.  Table 2 also demonstrates that, in absolute monetary 
terms, non-Spanish speaking households consume more housing than their Spanish-
speaking counterparts.  This data provides a brief overall picture of the two migrant 
groups, however my goal is to examine individual household preferences and to 
accomplish this we must specify a model of housing demand. 
 
III. The Housing Demand Model and its Estimation  
 
In this section, I describe and implement the methodology presented in Bajari 
and Kahn (2002) for modeling housing demand for individual households and capturing 
willingness to pay across different demographic groups for specific housing and 
neighborhood attributes.10  The methodology implements a three-step estimation 
procedure, which I describe here. 
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A. A Model of Housing Demand  
 
A primary goal of this work is to accurately measure the value that certain 
households place on different housing and neighborhood attributes.  In order to 
accomplish this task, I first must generate a hedonic that maps the price of a housing 
unit to both its physical and neighborhood attributes as well as to attributes that are 
unobserved by the econometrician but observed by the consumer.  Thus, I include the 
following physical attributes in the model: the number of rooms and the age of the unit, 
as well as two dummy variables to indicate ownership and if the unit is a single-
detached home.  The percent of college graduates, the percent of Spanish speakers, and 
whether the PUMA is located in the center city are the community characteristics 
observed within the hedonic.  I also allow for the presence of an unobserved product 
attribute ε j. 
The model contains 2000 households i, and 2000 housing units j for each MSA.  
Thus, the implicit prices faced by householdi when choosing j*(i) are satisfied locally by  
 
 
+++++= )(sin)()log()log( *,4*,3*,2*,1*,0 jjjjjjjjJj gleownageunitroomP ααααα  
)log()()log()log( *,7*,6*,5 jjjjjjj citynSpkpercentSpapercentBA εααα +++ .   (1) 
 
Equation 1 maintains the hedonic assumption that the unobserved product attribute jε  is 
independent of the observed product characteristics.  While one would expect that, in 
practice, unobserved attributes will likely be correlated with observed characteristics, 
the standard exogeneity assumption is maintained here. 
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Household i’s utility is determined as a function of its consumption of housing and a 
composite commodity.  It is written as  
),,(, cxuu jjiji ε=          (2) 
 
where jx  is the vector of observed housing and neighborhood characteristics associated 
with housing unit j, ε j represents the unobserved product characteristic, and  c 
represents the composite commodity normalized to one dollar.     
 
 
By substituting the household’s budget constraint into equation (2) we can see that for a 
given housing unit j*(i), the unit is utility maximizing for householdi if  
)),((,,(maxarg)(* jjijjij xPyxuij εε −=
.      (3) 
 
For a continuous housing characteristic kjx ,  of a utility maximizing housing unit j*, the 
following first order condition holds: 
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Equation (5) depicts the condition that the marginal rate of substitution between 
the composite commodity and a continuous characteristic is equal to the partial 
derivative of the hedonic with respect to that characteristic.  This condition will be 
crucial in the derivation of individual willingness to pay measurements.  These 
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measurements represent the necessary change in the consumption of the composite 
commodity to hold individual utility constant following a change in the consumption of 
a continuous characteristic – holding all other characteristics constant. 
 
The nature of the Census data used in this study prevents one from recovering the global 
identification of preferences.  Since the data represents a single cross section of 
households, equation (5) indicates that household preferences will be identified locally.  
Thus, I implement the following specification for consumer preferences, which follows 
directly from the substitution of equation (1) into equation (2):  
 
++++= )(sin)()log()log( 4,3,2,1,, jijijijiji gleownageunitroomu ββββ    
ccitynSpkpercentSpapercentBA jijijiji ++++ )log()()log()log( 8,7,6,5, εββββ    (6)     
 
where 
 
iii csdemographif ηβ += )(         (7) 
0)|( =Ε ii csdemographiη .        (8) 
 
In this parametric model, individual household level preference parameters 8,1, ii ββ − are 
written as functions of household demographics and a household specific residual, iη .   
 
My set of demographics consists of the age of the household head, sex, marital 
status, whether he or she is a college graduate and whether their first language is 
Spanish, the total household income and the household size. Since, on average, Spanish-
speaking households tend to earn less than non-Spanish-speaking households, income is 
extremely important in the model in order to avoid associating less-satisfactory 
outcomes with linguistic background rather than income differentials.  The presence of 
children in a household is often found to be a strong indicator of homeownership.11  I 
15 
 
http://GLJLWDOFRPPRQVLZXHGXXDXMH  
 
predict that education will be a key variable, especially when combined with spoken 
language, in explaining the disparity in housing preferences for Spanish speakers. The 
logic behind this follows from the fact that the homeownership process requires 
significant interaction with numerous parties, including banks, agents, loan companies, 
property managers, etc.  This necessarily involves communication, which may be 
hindered by poor English ability and low levels of education.  Spanish speakers could 
therefore find themselves limited to renting due to their inability to function effectively 
in the housing market.  
The next step in the model is to describe the identification of individual 
household taste parameters 8,1, ii ββ − .  We can use the specification for individual utility 
provided in equation (6) to rewrite equation (4) as  
kj
jj
kj
ki
x
xP
x ,
**
*,
, ),(
∂
∂
=
εβ
         (9) 
 
kj
jj
kjki x
xP
x
,
**
*,,
),(
∂
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=
εβ         (10) 
 
Note again that the coefficient on the composite commodity is normalized to 
one.  Thus, one can identify the population distribution of ki ,β in equation (10) as we 
observe the amount of the characteristic consumed kjx *, and posses estimates of the 
implicit prices described in equation (1).  These individual specific taste parameters can 
only be calculated for the continuous housing characteristics.   
 
In order to identify the taste parameters for discrete characteristics such as 
ownership and central city residence it is necessary make parametric assumptions.  
Without these assumptions I can only recover a bound for the discrete taste parameters.  
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In example, suppose that one observes a household i choosing their optimal housing 
bundle j*.  Now, define ixˆ  as a vector of observed characteristics of *jx , where own = 1 
indicates ownership.  Next, define ix~  as an equivalent vector, with the exception that 
now own = 0.  Thus, we can see that the implicit price for ownership that household i 
faces is     
( ) ( )jiji xPxPown
P
εε ,~,ˆ −=
∆
∆ .                   
 (11) 
 
 
Equation (11) tells us that we can estimate the price that individual houses for discrete 
characteristics by looking at differences in prices between otherwise identical housing 
bundles.  Household i’s preferences for ownership are then bounded by the following 
inequalities. 
[ ] 


∆
∆
<⇒=
own
Pown i 3,0 β         (12) 
[ ] 


∆
∆
>⇒=
own
Pown i 3,1 β         (13) 
Equation (12) demonstrates the situation when household i’s preference 
parameter for ownership is less than the implicit price described in equation (11), in this 
case we expect household i not to consume this characteristic.  Alternatively, equation 
(13) points to the case when household i’s preference parameter exceeds the implicit 
price for ownership.  
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In the following model, I assume that the discrete characteristics ki ,β  are normally 
distributed with a mean dependent on the demographic characteristics described above 
and an unknown variance.  For a discrete characteristic k,  
kikiki dh ,, ),( ηθβ +=          (14) 
( ) oi
own
ownki ddh ,0, ∑+= θθθ         (15) 
Here, )( ,oii dd =  is a vector of household i’s demographic characteristics and kθ  is a 
vector of parameters.  The term ki ,η  represents an i.i.d. taste shock to household i for the 
discrete characteristic k.  If ki ,η  is normally distributed and characterized with mean 
zero and a standard deviation σ , it is possible to model the probability that a household 
i = 1, ..., 2000 chooses to own their optimal housing bundle j*.  This probability is 
represented in the equation: 



∆
∆
−− );),((1 σθ
own
PdhG ki .       (16) 
 
Drawing on equation (16), one can derive the likelihood function for the population 
distribution of tastes for each of the discrete characteristics.  This likelihood function is 
depicted as follows: 
 
*
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)( ));),((1();),((),( 1
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ii ownj
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PdhG
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PdhGL σθσθσθ
∆
∆
−−
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∆
−=
−
=
∏ .  (17) 
Equation (17) is estimated for each discrete characteristic individually using 
maximum likelihood.  The exponents included in equation (17), * )(iownj  and * )(1 iownj− are 
indicator variables, which take on the values of one and zero respectively when 
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household i chooses ownership.  In the case of the other discrete characteristics, their 
observed consumption is inserted into these indicator variables.  
 
B. Estimating the Model  
 
Now, we are ready to employ the model of housing demand described in the 
previous subsection in conjunction with the city samples.  The first step in this 
procedure is to estimate equation (1) in order to attain the implicit prices for the housing 
and neighborhood characteristics.  The second step is to use equation (10) to obtain 
individuals’ preference parameters for continuous housing characteristics.  The third 
step is to generate the joint distribution of tastes and demographics.  I obtain the joint 
distribution for continuous characteristics by regressing the household level preference 
parameters derived in the second step across demographic characteristics using a simple 
linear regression model.  For the discrete characteristics we can estimate equation (17) 
using maximum likelihood.   
I apply local linear methods described in Fan and Gijbels (1996) in order to 
estimate the implicit prices that face households choosing their optimal housing bundle 
*j .  This approach applies the linear regression technique locally, thus placing larger 
weights on observations nearer to the optimal bundle.  In essence, it allows for the 
estimates of a unit’s implicit prices to be generated from a set of similar observations 
versus examining the entire sample.  The size of the area around our observation that is 
incorporated into the regression is called the bandwidth.  I follow the approach 
implemented in Bajari and Kahn (2002) and use weighted least squares with a normal 
kernel function and a bandwidth of 3 to estimate *,7*,0 jj αα − .  The estimates of implicit 
prices allow one to recover the unobserved product characteristic for each unit *j .  
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Since we observe the implicit prices of our observed characteristics as well as the 
observed level of consumption and the actual price, it is a simple exercise to obtain the 
hedonic residual, which was earlier specified as our unobserved product attribute *jε .    
Upon estimating the implicit prices faced by each household i, for housing and 
community attributes, I can generate estimates of individual household preference 
parameters for the continuous characteristics using equation (10).  Given that I observe 
the quantity kjx *,  of an attribute that is consumed and possess estimates of the implicit 
prices for each attribute, I can solve for the household’s preference parameters ki ,β .  At 
this stage, I posses a full set of individual household implicit prices and preference 
parameters for each of the three MSA’s.  Next, I model the joint distribution of tastes 
and demographics. 
For continuous housing characteristics, I use a linear regression model to obtain 
the distribution of tastes across demographic characteristics described by equations (7-
8).  By regressing these preference parameters on demographics, I reveal the differences 
in taste for continuous characteristics across demographics.  I choose not to present 
these results; rather, in Section 4, I measure the differences in willingness to pay for 
shifts in the levels of consumption of housing characteristics across demographics.   
Next, I address the estimation of the discrete characteristics, which are not 
identified by equation (10).  I estimate equation (17) using maximum likelihood in order 
to obtain the population distribution of tastes for discrete characteristics.  I present these 
results along with the results for the continuous characteristics in the form of willingness 
to pay measurements and test my hypotheses in the following section. 
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IV. Results  
I apply the methodology presented in Section 3 to each city samples in order to 
test several hypotheses regarding preferences of Spanish-speaking migrants.  I first 
calculate the consumption of housing characteristics across my samples with respect to 
migrant demographics.  Then, I generate willingness to pay measurements for each 
housing and neighborhood characteristic.  Next, these measurements are regressed on 
household demographics to yield the distribution of tastes for each sample.           
I present reduced form evidence on housing consumption across the 
demographic characteristics for each of the city samples in Table 3.  These results offer 
a snapshot of the different levels of housing consumption for different demographic 
groups.  Household head demographic characteristics such as age, language, sex, marital 
status, as well as household income and household size are controlled for within each 
regression.  Table 3 consists of 21 separate OLS regressions that effectively regress the 
consumption of housing or neighborhood characteristics on the above demographics.  
These regressions yield several interesting results.  Across the three cities, holding other 
demographic factors constant, Spanish speakers consume .84 to 1.03 less rooms than 
non-Spanish speakers.12  This is particularly surprising given the descriptive statistics 
presented earlier in Table 2, where Spanish-speaking migrants demonstrated household 
sizes that were at least 1.5 times larger across all three samples.  Spanish-speaking 
migrants also live in neighborhoods with 7%-15% more Spanish speakers, are 10%-18% 
less likely to reside in single-detached housing, are 4%-28% more likely to reside in the 
central city, and are 8-14% less-likely to be homeowners.     
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A. Demand for Spanish-Speaking Neighbors – Hypotheses (1-2)  
In order to test the hypothesis that Spanish-speaking migrants prefer to locate in 
neighborhoods that are characterized by high concentrations of Spanish speakers, I 
construct a willingness to pay measurement for a change in the level of Spanish 
speakers from 10%-35% within a community. Following Bajari and Kahn’s 
methodology, I let iSPANSPKWTP% denote household i’s willingness to pay for an 
increase in the percent of Spanish speakers in a neighborhood.    
 
)10log(.)35(log(.% ,6 −= iiSPANSPKWTP β  
Holding other characteristics constant, one can calculate the monetary amount 
necessary to hold individual household utilities constant, given a change in the percent 
of Spanish speakers present within a community.  The results of this calculation are then 
regressed on household demographics and presented in Table 4.  Across all three cities 
Spanish speakers demonstrate a preference for higher levels of Spanish speakers, willing 
to pay from $60-$427 for the increase.  The largest result comes from the Los Angeles – 
Long Beach MSA, where Spanish-speaking migrants are willing to pay an extra $427 to 
live with more of their peers. 
The coefficients on the Spanish speaking variable in Table 4 present empirical 
support for Hypothesis 2 - which stated that Spanish-speaking migrants would seek to 
locate in communities with high levels of Spanish speakers in order to receive positive 
network effects, lower transaction costs, and better employment opportunities.  The 
logic behind the willingness to pay argument used throughout this section is that if a 
characteristic is truly important to a household’s welfare, one should observe a high 
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willingness to pay for the characteristic in question.  The positive and significant 
coefficients for Spanish-speaking migrants in this case could arise from a number of 
factors, including the ability of language enclaves to shelter non-native speakers and 
reduce the importance of English proficiency in wage rates.  They could also reflect the 
importance of social networks in providing employment opportunities and reducing 
daily transaction costs.   
Table 4 also includes several variables to describe the interaction effects between 
Spanish speakers and income, age, and higher education.  The interaction variables 
provide further evidence against Hypothesis 1, as Spanish speakers with higher levels of 
assimilation as described by income, education, and age are willing to pay the most to 
avoid such neighborhoods.  In example, a college educated Spanish speaker would be 
willing to pay $552 (-417+(-135)) to avoid such an increase; likely a reflection of the 
large wage differential between English and non-English speaking college graduates.  
Hypothesis 1 would predict that the largest potential for gains from integration would 
arise in individuals who are younger, possessing lower levels of education, and lower 
household incomes.  This prediction arises from the fact that language enclaves have the 
greatest depressing effect on English fluency for these individuals.  In this model, 
English fluency drives higher wage rates and thus corresponds with higher lifetime 
incomes. 
Another interesting aspect of the results in Table 4 is that while Spanish speakers 
in each MSA demonstrate positive coefficients, the magnitudes vary significantly across 
MSA's.  Reduced form evidence in Table 3 reveals that in the Los Angeles - Long 
Beach MSA, which demonstrated by far the largest willingness to pay measurement, 
Spanish speakers live in communities with 15% more Spanish speakers than their non-
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Spanish speaking counterparts - nearly two times the numbers displayed by fellow 
MSA's.  The concentrations of Spanish speakers within this MSA were also much 
higher than the other two samples, with levels rising as high as 87% in some 
neighborhoods.  The different observed magnitudes in Table 4 provides support for the 
concept that enclave size does matter, indicating higher returns for Spanish speakers 
locating in more highly concentrated neighborhoods.       
 
B. Demand for Highly Educated Peers – Hypothesis 3  
Table 4 demonstrated the willingness to pay for Spanish speakers within a 
community, however the effects, while statistically significant and supportive, are of 
relatively small magnitudes in comparison with those accompanying a community’s 
percent of college graduates.  In the introduction, I presented results from the literature 
that demonstrated that Spanish speakers have lower returns to education than those who 
speak English.  While this result is not surprising, it is important to consider when 
analyzing the data on willingness to pay for college educated neighbors presented in 
Table 5.   
In Table 5, migrant willingness to pay for an increase in the percentage of 
college graduates from 10%-30% is calculated and then regressed across demographic 
characteristics.  Holding income and other demographics constant, Spanish-speaking 
migrants are willing to pay $438 to $1052 less for the additional college graduates.  
These coefficients represent empirical support for Hypothesis 3, which predicted that 
Spanish-speaking migrants would place lower valuations on the levels of highly 
educated persons within communities.  College graduates on the other hand are willing 
to pay between $407 and $1077 more than non-college graduates in order to live in a 
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community with the higher level of college graduates – all else equal.  In Bajari and 
Khan's (2000) analysis they obtain similar measurements demonstrating a relative 
distaste of black migrants towards more highly educated communities and a relative 
preference of college graduates for such communities.  They use these findings to offer 
a partial justification for black urbanization that calls on higher existing levels of college 
graduates in suburbs to explain a sorting of highly skilled individuals into the suburbs 
and blacks into central cities.  Both sets of results indicate that blacks and Spanish-
speakers likely have lower expected returns from highly educated neighbors and are 
therefore less willing to pay for such neighbors. 
 
C. Spatial Assimilation Theory and Implications – Hypothesis 4  
In an effort to provide a cohesive view of the different data I present in this 
research, I employ a test of the spatial assimilation hypothesis across each of the 
housing and neighborhood characteristics.   The inclusion of the three interaction 
variables for Spanish speakers in the regressions will offer a broader perspective of the 
preferences of this group.  While standard tests of the spatial assimilation hypothesis 
usually look to actual outcomes and consumption patterns, looking at this hypothesis 
from a willingness to pay perspective will allow for the specification of taste changes 
across assimilation measures.  The theory predicts the integration of minorities into 
neighborhoods that reflect their level of assimilation and economic status.  Assuming 
that the housing market is run competitively, the measures of willingness to pay will 
have consumption indications.    
In this research, neighborhood characteristics include the level of college 
graduates and the level of Spanish speakers.  The spatial assimilation hypothesis 
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indicates that Spanish speakers possessing higher levels of income and education, who 
are further along in the life cycle, should demonstrate preferences for neighborhoods 
with high levels of college graduates and low levels of Spanish speakers.  The 
statistically significant interaction coefficients in Table 4 (level of Spanish speakers) 
unambiguously support Hypothesis 4.  Table 5 possesses mixed results.  The interaction 
between Spanish speakers and college graduates produces the expected signs - depicting 
the high valuations placed on the level of education present in a neighborhood for this 
group.  However, age seems to have a negative effect on the valuation of the level of 
education in a neighborhood.  While this result runs counter to the spatial assimilation 
hypothesis, it makes intuitive sense when one thinks about the shorter period in which 
elder individuals have to capitalize on their gains from this exposure.  The literature also 
tells us that the acquisition of fluency in English becomes more difficult over time.  
Omitting the interaction of age and Spanish speaking, the results in Table 5 generally 
run inline with Hypothesis 4.  These two sets of results demonstrate strong indicators 
that the spatial assimilation theory holds for at least the set of neighborhood 
characteristics.  Next, we can look at the consumption of physical housing attributes. 
A significant factor that characterizes neighborhoods with high levels of Spanish 
speaker is a high occurrence of overcrowding.  In Section 2, we notice that on average 
Spanish-speaking migrants have household sizes roughly 1.5 times larger than non 
Spanish-speaking migrants.  The reduced form results in Table 3 demonstrate that, 
holding all else constant, Spanish-speakers consume approximately 1 room less than 
their counterparts.  These initial findings correspond directly with previous research on 
the topic.  Myers, Baer, and Choi (1996) find that Hispanics and Asians have markedly 
higher rates of overcrowding and that the discrepancy is even greater for recent 
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immigrants.  They present the argument that Asian and Latin American communities are 
“close contact” societies and find that their data reveals a persistence in crowding 
among Asian and Hispanic households with incomes more than twice the average of all 
households. 
Table 6 shows that income, marriage, household size, and college education have 
a positive effect on how much a general household is willing to pay for the increase in 
space.  The results demonstrate that Spanish-speaking migrants are willing to pay $629 
to $1023 less than non Spanish-speaking migrants.13  This is a considerable difference.  
Referring now to the interaction effects, we return our focus to the spatial assimilation 
model.  Again, we find strong empirical support for the reflection of improved station in 
the relative taste parameters.  The coefficients on the interaction of education and age 
with Spanish speakers unanimously demonstrate the positive effects these two 
characteristics have on taste parameters for space.  Interestingly, in correspondence with 
the findings of Myers, Baer, and Choi (1996) the interaction of income with Spanish 
speaking seems to have an indistinguishable effect on preferences.     
Table 7 and Table 8 present household willingness to pay estimates for single-
detached housing and central city residence.  Given that Spanish speakers reside 
predominantly in city centers and single-detached housing is generally found in suburbs, 
the analysis of these factors may provide insights into the observed pattern of 
migration.14  Table 7 shows that Spanish-speaking migrants are willing to pay 
significantly lower amounts to live in single-detached housing across all three samples.  
The difference is most pronounced in the Los Angeles –Long Beach MSA, where 
Spanish-speaking migrants are willing to pay $822 less than non-Spanish speakers to 
live in single-detached units. Table 8 offers willingness to pay estimates for central city 
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residence.  In each of the samples, Spanish-speaking migrants are willing to pay more to 
live in central city residences, with the largest effect ($389) in the San Diego MSA.   
Analyzing the interaction results in Table 7 and 8 one finds further support for 
the spatial assimilation hypothesis.  The interaction results in Table 7 all indicate, with 
exception of the interaction of income in the San Diego MSA, that more highly 
assimilated Spanish speakers will pay more to obtain single-detached housing.  The 
interaction effects in the case of central city residence are mixed.  However, the full set 
of results reflects that central city areas, as defined in the census data, may have 
desirable traits in San Diego and Los Angeles - Long Beach.  Thus, the mixed effects 
may represent geographic definitions within the data sets.  Furthermore, note the 
relatively low statistical significance of all the interaction results in Table 8.   
In the final set of data shown in Table 9, I present willingness to pay 
measurements for housing ownership.15  Spanish speakers demonstrate significantly 
lower valuations of this attribute.  In the Anaheim - Garden Grove - Santa Ana MSA 
they are willing to pay $3083 less than their non-Spanish speaking counterparts to own 
housing.  The interactions yield that in each city the combination of age and Spanish 
speakers have positive effects on the desire for ownership.  Within the Los Angeles - 
Long Beach MSA and the Anaheim-Garden Grove-Santa Ana MSA, the interaction 
effects generally have the sign intimated by the spatial assimilation hypothesis.  In each 
of the housing characteristics discussed, one found considerable support indicating that 
as Spanish speakers attained higher levels of assimilation, as described by age, income, 
and education, their taste parameters shifted accordingly.         
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V. CONCLUSIONS 
Since the repeal of the immigrant origins quota system in 1965 the levels of 
Hispanic immigration have grown rapidly.  This demographic group has demonstrated 
strong growth through both immigration and life-cycle effects over the last three 
decades.  I attempt to explain the location patterns of Spanish-speaking migrants 
through an understanding of their consumption preferences.  In order to attain measures 
by which I can describe relative preferences, I estimate the three-step process described 
in Bajari and Khan (2002).  With these results I construct willingness to pay 
measurements for the characteristics that enter my model of housing demand.  Through 
the willingness to pay measurements I test Hypotheses (1-4). 
My estimates reveal that Spanish-speaking migrants demonstrate a preference 
for neighborhoods with higher concentrations of Spanish speakers.  This finding directly 
supports Hypothesis 1, which indicates that Spanish-speaking migrants choose to reside 
in communities with higher levels of Spanish speakers in order to obtain higher returns 
for their skill sets, information regarding employment, or positive effects from social 
networks.  These migrants are also much less willing to pay for highly educated 
neighbors, implying that they have lower returns to education or are unable to capture 
the benefits of residing in a high human capital environment.  Reduced form regressions 
and willingness to pay estimates jointly explain the observed levels of crowding within 
this demographic group.  On average, Spanish-speaking migrants posses household sizes 
at least 1.5 times larger than their counterparts while consuming approximately 1 less 
room per household.  They are also significantly less willing to pay for an increase in 
space.  Spanish-speaking migrants demonstrate a relative preference for central city 
residence and are much less willing to pay for ownership and single-detached dwellings.  
29 
 
http://GLJLWDOFRPPRQVLZXHGXXDXMH  
 
Given that suburban housing tends to be larger and is composed of predominantly 
single-detached dwellings, one can recognize that the observed preferences of Spanish 
speakers will lead them towards central city residence.     
The analysis of the interaction effects of Spanish speaking with age, income, and 
education demonstrates strong overall support for the spatial assimilation hypothesis.  In 
the context of examining location patterns, these results imply that more highly 
assimilated Spanish-speakers will seek to consume a housing bundle that reflects their 
level of assimilation.  This process would see wealthier and more highly educated Spanish 
speakers immigrate from urban language enclaves into suburban single-detached 
dwellings.   
   Taken together, the results above present a convincing argument based on 
willingness to pay measures that explains the current concentrations of Spanish speakers 
in central cities, residing in crowded quarters characterized by low levels of 
homeownership and higher densities of Spanish speakers.  This research indicates that 
Spanish-speaking migrants with low levels of assimilation will continue to seek out 
language enclaves and thus, we can expect continued population growth of Spanish 
speakers within pre-existing enclaves.         
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Footnotes: 
 
1 This research focuses on the location decision of Spanish-speaking migrants and while recognizing that 
discrimination in the housing and credit markets is likely present to some degree, I do not focus here on such 
effects. 
2  “Crowded” is defined as more than 1 person per room and “severely crowded” is defined as more than 1.5 
persons per room. 
3 All descriptive statistics presented on Santa Ana were taken from the U.S. Census Bureau’s website.  
www.census.gov.    
4 John F. Kain.  “Housing Segregation, Negro Employment, and Metropolitan Decentralization.”  The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 82, pp. 175-197.  1968.  
5 In their analysis, Chiswick and Miller estimate the return on labor market earnings for a non-fluent 
immigrant to obtain fluency to be 17%-34%.   
6 These connections constitute a unique form of social capital that can provide access to foreign employment 
opportunities, living situations, and cultural support.  (Massey et al., 1994; Mines, 1981). 
7See Massey and Denton (1985). 
8 I also investigated several metropolitan areas within Texas, but chose to focus on California due to its 
larger migrant pools. 
9 http://www.ipums.org/usa/hgeographic/pumaa.html 
10 See Bajari and Khan (2002) for an in depth description of the methods implemented in this section. 
11Lauren Krivo’s analysis of Hispanic households found that it has less of an effect for Hispanics than their 
Anglo counterparts. 
12Bajari and Kahn (2002), whose work this paper is closely related to, find in a comparative analysis on 
blacks and whites that blacks consume only .2 to .28 less rooms than whites in their samples.   
13 Note the reflection of observed consumption in Table 3 with the revealed preference results in Table 6. 
14 In general, one can expect that city centers are characterized by a more intense use of land with fewer 
detached housing opportunities. 
15 I choose not to include willingness to pay results for the age of unit as I find that the effects are minimal 
across demographics. 
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Table 1:Demographic Means for Populations and Migrant Populations:     
   Los Angeles- Long Beach   Anaheim-Santa Ana-Garden Grove   San Diego     
  
Non-
Spanish 
Speakers 
Non-
Spanish -
Speaking 
Migrants 
Spanish 
Speakers 
Spanish 
Speaking 
Migrants 
Non-
Spanish 
Speakers 
Non-
Spanish -
Speaking 
Migrants 
Spanish 
Speakers 
Spanish 
Speaking 
Migrants 
Non-Spanish 
Speakers 
Non-
Spanish- 
Speaking 
Migrants 
Spanish 
Speakers 
Spanish- 
Speaking 
Migrants 
Age 48.6509 40.1740 41.6822 36.0615 47.2031 40.3426 40.2703 35.6547 47.4801 40.5885 42.4887 37.5644
College Graduate 0.3089 0.3541 0.0706 0.0811 0.3387 0.3514 0.1008 0.1124 0.2922 0.3059 0.1350 0.1354
Household Income 49441.6706 48116.6840 33432.0202 31414.4006 56937.7020 54939.7856 42311.6221 40565.5928 45412.0195 43570.7583 34083.0562 31838.9625
Male 0.6541 0.6634 0.7289 0.7257 0.7065 0.7086 0.7907 0.7964 0.6868 0.6905 0.7182 0.7210
Household Size 2.3928 2.4041 3.9254 3.8910 2.5091 2.4642 4.1754 4.1319 2.3835 2.3682 3.5685 3.5351
Married 0.5040 0.4698 0.6210 0.5949 0.5857 0.5431 0.6967 0.6840 0.5569 0.5213 0.6079 0.5775
Migrant 0.4709 1 0.5325  1 0.5218 1 0.5950  1 0.5699 1 0.6039 1
Reside in City 0.4737 0.4861 0.4897 0.5169 0.1548 0.1554 0.4903 0.4853 0.4931 0.4908 0.5192 0.5122
Home Owner 0.5638 0.3859 0.3617 0.2256 0.6572 0.4838 0.4167 0.2899 0.5898 0.4271 0.4177 0.2773
Single Unit 0.5581 0.4070 0.4571 0.3422 0.5511 0.3953 0.4457 0.3127 0.5431 0.4112 0.4680 0.3458
Rooms 4.8533 4.3550 3.6615 3.3086 5.4203 4.9060 4.1647 3.8827 5.1389 4.7580 4.2808 3.9967
Age of Unit 32.7034 27.7972 34.1483 30.3345 21.3393 18.0307 25.2762 22.4528 22.1444 18.1181 25.0064 22.2561
             
Notes:  The raw data is from the U.S. Census of Population and Housing 1% Metropolitan Sample.  This sample includes all household heads.     
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Table 2: Summary Means for Migrants Included in Structural Estimation   
  Los Angeles- Long Beach Anaheim-Santa Ana-Garden Grove San Diego 
  
Non-Spanish- 
Speaking Migrants 
Spanish-Speaking 
Migrants 
Non-Spanish-
Speaking Migrants
Spanish-Speaking 
Migrants 
Non-Spanish-
Speaking Migrants 
Spanish-Speaking 
Migrants 
              
Age 40.5079 36.6790 40.5041 36.1418 40.8282 37.1654 
College Graduate 0.3354 0.0724 0.3487 0.0957 0.3041 0.1535 
Household Income 48069.5243 32944.3618 54480.4226 40122.6879 43340.3368 31001.8504 
Male 0.6537 0.7403 0.6985 0.7872 0.6901 0.7205 
Household Size 2.4620 3.8423 2.4878 4.1383 2.3144 3.4646 
Married 0.4750 0.6030 0.5407 0.6631 0.5057 0.5472 
Reside in City 0.4880 0.4935 0.1624 0.4929 0.5040 0.4921 
Home Owner 0.3977 0.2078 0.4907 0.2624 0.4330 0.2717 
Single Unit 0.4086 0.3358 0.4063 0.2837 0.4181 0.3386 
Rooms 4.3710 3.3191 4.9313 3.9326 4.7652 3.9488 
Community % Spanish Speaking 0.2078 0.3994 0.1244 0.2396 0.1131 0.2109 
Community % College Graduate 0.3081 0.2013 0.3269 0.2464 0.2960 0.2243 
Age of Unit 28.0363 28.9249 18.0556 22.1082 18.1031 22.9508 
Annual Housing Expenditure 11934.5091 8335.1660 13684.4448 10212.7713 10834.2430 7979.0079 
       
Notes:  The raw data is from the U.S. Census of Population and Housing 1% Metropolitan Sample; each city sample consists of 2000 migrants drawn at 
random.  Annual housing expenditure for renters is simply monthly rent times twelve, for owners I use the reported price of the home multiplied by 7.5%. 
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Table 3:  Descriptive OLS Regressions of Migrant Housing Choice   
        
Los Angeles - Long 
Beach Rooms Age of Unit 
Single Unit-
Detached 
Home 
Owner 
Central City 
Residence 
Community % 
College Graduate 
Community % 
Spanish 
Speaking 
Constant 2.5816 30.1096 0.0072 -0.0531 0.6413 0.2990 0.2180 
Household Income 0.0197 -0.0216 0.0034 0.0039 -0.0005 0.0007 -0.0008 
College Graduate 0.1116 1.3908 -0.0462 0.0597 0.0320 0.0628 -0.0465 
Spanish Speaking -0.9851 1.1425 -0.1114 -0.1382 0.0405 -0.0564 0.1485 
Household Size 0.1758 -0.1130 0.0457 0.0108 -0.0197 -0.0172 0.0165 
Age 0.0065 -0.0238 0.0012 0.0034 -0.0011 -0.0001 0.0003 
Married 0.4253 -1.7686 0.1243 0.1716 -0.0791 0.0029 -0.0189 
Male -0.1405 0.8875 0.0479 -0.0055 -0.0141 -0.0009 -0.0025 
R2 0.3160 0.0050 0.1830 0.2300 0.0220 0.2470 0.2520 
          
Anaheim - Santa Ana - 
Garden Grove Rooms Age of Unit 
Single Unit-
Detached 
Home 
Owner 
Central City 
Residence 
Community % 
College Graduate 
Community % 
Spanish 
Speaking 
Constant 2.8062 20.6979 -0.0968 -0.1526 0.2198 0.3167 0.1454 
Household Income 0.0167 -0.0310 0.0032 0.0035 -0.0012 0.0004 -0.0004 
College Graduate 0.2718 -2.9190 0.0618 0.1353 -0.0465 0.0267 -0.0180 
Spanish Speaking -1.0321 2.1439 -0.1785 -0.1422 0.2841 -0.0573 0.0943 
Household Size 0.2008 0.4718 0.0666 0.0074 0.0080 -0.0069 0.0059 
Age 0.0102 -0.0184 0.0017 0.0075 -0.0004 0.0000 -0.0003 
Married 0.5384 -1.6087 0.1028 0.1631 -0.0015 0.0096 -0.0075 
Male -0.1202 0.7199 0.0244 -0.0082 0.0305 -0.0109 0.0115 
R2 0.2860 0.0350 0.2200 0.2460 0.1000 0.1190 0.1380 
          
          
San Diego Rooms Age of Unit 
Single Unit-
Detached 
Home 
Owner 
Central City 
Residence 
Community % 
College Graduate 
Community % 
Spanish 
Speaking 
Constant 2.3477 21.7586 -0.0445 -0.1689 0.6730 0.2947 0.1058 
Household Income 0.0181 -0.0423 0.0029 0.0035 -0.0003 0.0003 -0.0002 
College Graduate 0.4133 -0.6688 0.0768 0.1304 0.1466 0.0447 -0.0233 
Spanish Speaking -0.8367 4.3034 -0.0969 -0.0815 0.0022 -0.0489 0.0783 
Household Size 0.2967 -0.0439 0.0563 0.0016 0.0020 -0.0107 0.0121 
Age 0.0144 -0.0240 0.0018 0.0073 -0.0024 0.0000 0.0000 
Married 0.3635 -4.7569 0.1137 0.1905 -0.1243 0.0023 -0.0080 
Male 0.0735 2.7077 0.0731 0.0163 -0.0614 -0.0039 -0.0034 
R2 0.3280 0.0380 0.1810 0.2510 0.0430 0.1180 0.1390 
        
This table presents results from twenty-one reduced form OLS regressions.  In the regressions, housing consumption 
measures are regressed on demographics.  Household income is measured in thousands of 1989 dollars and the 
dependent variables "College Graduate," "Spanish Speaking," "Married," and "Male" are dummy variables set to one if the 
household head satisfies their conditions.  Thus, the base case is representative of a female, non-Spanish speaking, non-
college graduate, who is not married.  There are 2000 observations in each regression.    
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Table 4: Estimates of Willingness to Pay for Increase in Spanish Speakers (10%-35%)* 
(t-statistics in parentheses) 
  Anaheim-Garden Grove-Santa Ana Los Angeles-Long Beach San Diego 
        
Constant 381.649 744.011 30.461 
  (38.190) (11.513) (4.712) 
Household Income 0.198 -1.873 -0.176 
  (2.914) (-4.032) (-3.452) 
College Graduate -5.760 -134.649 -6.477 
  (-1.010) (-3.379) (-1.626) 
Spanish Speaking 102.475 427.294 59.605 
  (4.473) (3.943) (3.709) 
Household Size 2.430 73.909 -8.242 
  (1.350) (7.359) (-6.129) 
Age 0.074 2.118 -0.343 
  (0.408) (1.729) (-2.999) 
Married -1.358 -2.703 -7.777 
  (-0.203) (-0.068) (-1.716) 
Male 4.171 -11.929 -3.714 
  (0.658) (-0.322) (-0.916) 
-0.751 1.317 -0.042 Spanish Speaking * 
Income (-3.455) (1.282) (-0.238) 
6.510 -416.762 -25.339 Spanish Speaking * 
College Graduate (0.265) (-3.342) (-1.802) 
-0.438 0.893 -1.277 Spanish Speaking * 
Age (-0.786) (0.344) (-3.258) 
R-Squared 0.046 0.197 0.074 
Observations 2000.00 2000.00 2000.00 
    
*Each column of the table presents results from separate OLS regressions.  The dependent variable is a 
migrant’s willingness to pay per year for an increase of Spanish speakers from 10%-35%, holding all other 
housing product characteristics constant.  T-statistics are reported beneath coefficient estimates in shaded 
rows.  The omitted category is a non-Spanish speaking, non-college graduate, who is female and not married.  
Household income is measured in 1,000s of 1989 dollars. 
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Table 5: Estimates of Willingness to Pay for Increase in College Graduates (10%-30%)* 
**(t-statistics appear in parentheses) 
  
Anaheim-Garden Grove-Santa 
Ana Los Angeles-Long Beach San Diego 
        
Constant 3664.400 4352.665 3053.624 
  (31.078) (20.660) (35.258) 
Household Income 6.694 24.390 4.164 
  (8.343) (16.105) (6.090) 
College Graduate 407.245 1077.382 452.736 
  (6.054) (8.293) (8.485) 
Spanish Speaking -1051.683 -999.012 -437.952 
  (-3.891) (-2.828) (-2.034) 
Household Size -71.934 -238.084 -93.202 
  (-3.387) (-7.272) (-5.173) 
Age 5.136 4.400 2.649 
  (2.395) (1.102) (1.727) 
Married 228.595 366.371 83.802 
  (2.902) (2.843) (1.380) 
Male -138.993 -63.080 -20.259 
  (-1.859) (-0.522) (-0.373) 
1.588 -7.653 2.275 Spanish Speaking * 
Income (0.619) (-2.285) (0.955) 
49.352 686.526 38.927 Spanish Speaking * 
College Graduate (0.170) (1.688) (0.207) 
5.021 -1.209 -4.290 Spanish Speaking * 
Age (0.763) (-0.143) (-0.817) 
R-Squared 0.163 0.336 0.151 
Observations 2000.00 2000.00 2000.00 
    
*Each column of the table presents results from separate OLS regressions.  The dependent variable is a 
migrant’s willingness to pay per year for an increase of college graduates from 10%-30%, holding all other 
housing product characteristics constant.  T-statistics are reported beneath coefficient estimates in shaded 
rows.  The omitted category is a non-Spanish speaking, non-college graduate, who is female and not married.  
Household income is measured in 1,000s of 1989 dollars. 
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Table 6: Estimates of Willingness to Pay for Increase in Rooms (4-6)* 
(t-statistics in parentheses) 
  
Anaheim-Garden 
Grove-Santa Ana Los Angeles-Long Beach San Diego 
        
Constant 1031.040 1094.617 915.317 
  (13.210) (12.414) (10.789) 
Household Income 11.397 10.664 12.161 
  (20.315) (17.773) (18.157) 
College Graduate 35.194 207.987 280.104 
  (0.731) (4.134) (5.359) 
Spanish Speaking -635.105 -1023.449 -628.651 
  (-4.853) (-5.062) (-2.981) 
Household Size 86.486 115.064 170.882 
  (7.130) (7.244) (9.683) 
Age 3.203 7.085 10.369 
  (2.165) (4.417) (6.890) 
Married 251.375 344.114 275.633 
  (5.266) (5.842) (4.635) 
Male -57.415 -57.909 57.186 
  (-1.282) (-1.035) (1.075) 
-1.610 0.319 -1.269 Spanish Speaking * 
Income (-1.297) (0.166) (-0.544) 
428.355 466.384 140.801 Spanish Speaking * 
College Graduate (2.844) (2.149) (0.763) 
3.463 8.845 3.163 Spanish Speaking * 
Age (1.103) (1.798) (0.615) 
R-Squared 0.354 0.333 0.358 
Observations 2000.00 2000.00 2000.00 
    
*Each column of the table presents results from separate OLS regressions.  The dependent 
variable is a migrant’s willingness to pay per year for an increase from 4 - 6 rooms in a 
housing unit, holding all other housing product characteristics constant.  T-statistics are 
reported beneath coefficient estimates in shaded rows.  The omitted category is a non-
Spanish speaking, non-college graduate, who is female and not married.  Household income 
is measured in 1,000s of 1989 dollars. 
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Table 7: Estimates of Willingness to Pay Single-Detached Housing* 
(t-statistics in parentheses) 
  
Anaheim-Garden 
Grove-Santa Ana 
Los Angeles-Long 
Beach San Diego
       
Constant 3352.087 540.643 2046.803
  (13.685) (2.276) (14.467)
Household Income 6.005 13.337 4.429
  (12.423) (12.088) (10.805)
College Graduate 143.005 -108.429 88.575
  (3.950) (-1.301) (3.244)
Male -4.046 129.235 78.429
  (-.096) (1.630) (2.745)
Household Size 80.748 127.663 42.116
  (6.950) (6.193) (4.496)
Age 5.674 4.306 4.694
  (4.593) (1.659) (5.715)
Married 255.555 475.500 220.898
  (5.866) (5.768) (6.995)
Spanish Speaking -621.509 -821.816 -229.306
  (-3.743) (-3.442) (-1.873)
1.702 1.847 -0.405Spanish Speaking * 
Income (.983) (.731) (-.308)
87.963 408.469 23.735Spanish Speaking * 
College Graduate (.574) (1.601) (.253)
6.835 5.582 2.466Spanish Speaking * 
Age (1.835) (1.011) (.840)
Price of Single -1.000 -1.000 -1.000
  (-17.367) (-9.990) (-19.101)
Observations 2000.000 2000.000 2000.000
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*Each column of the table presents results from separate maximum likelihood estimations.  
Note that the Price of Single is normalized to –1.  The statistics presented here were 
generated through a probit estimation of single on demographics with an inclusion of the 
estimate for the price of single-detached housing.  I then divide through by the coefficient of 
the price of single. The omitted category is a non-Spanish speaking, non-college graduate, 
who is female and not married.  Household income is measured in 1,000s of 1989 dollars.      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8: Estimates of Willingness to Pay for City Residence* 
(t-statistics in parentheses) 
  
Anaheim-Garden 
Grove-Santa Ana 
Los Angeles-Long 
Beach San Diego 
        
Constant -427.897 118.205 1225.343 
  (-8.140) (1.055) (3.796) 
Household Income -0.035 -1.932 -1.543 
  (-.185) (-2.442) (-.595) 
College Graduate 3.299 20.291 1074.943 
  (.262) (.318) (5.377) 
Male -0.191 -31.077 -454.543 
  (-.019) (-.525) (-2.257) 
Household Size -1.794 -39.692 30.229 
  (-.690) (-2.460) (.447) 
Age -0.145 -3.231 -17.286 
  (-.378) (-1.659) (-3.034) 
Married -5.603 -211.436 -898.400 
  (-.536) (-3.329) (-3.988) 
Spanish Speaking 44.345 154.778 388.543 
  (1.463) (.880) (.487) 
-0.495 -2.470 -5.771 Spanish Speaking * 
Income (-1.119) (-1.517) (-.63066) 
-10.837 58.179 186.029 Spanish Speaking * 
College Graduate (-.287) (.289) (.261) 
-0.070 3.188 -5.371 Spanish Speaking * 
Age (-.112) (.764) (-.277) 
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Price of City 1.000 1.000 1.000 
  (8.508) (4.505) (1.122) 
Observations 2000 2000 2000 
 
 
 
*Each column of the table presents results from separate maximum likelihood estimations.  
Note that the Price of City is normalized to 1.  The statistics presented here were generated 
through a probit estimation of city on demographics, with an inclusion of the estimate for the 
price of central city housing.  I then divide through by the absolute value of the price of city 
coefficient. The omitted category is a non-Spanish speaking, non-college graduate, who is 
female and not married.  Household income is measured in 1,000s of 1989 dollars. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 9: Estimates of Willingness to Pay for Ownership* 
(t-statistics in parentheses) 
  
Anaheim-Garden 
Grove-Santa Ana 
Los Angeles-Long 
Beach San Diego 
        
Constant -4249.292 4220.588 1406.620 
  (-3.887) (-6.610) (3.726) 
Household Income 58.833 19.963 19.489 
  (12.855) (13.174) (13.105) 
College Graduate 1695.375 287.738 512.489 
  (5.638) (2.795) (6.061) 
Male -216.292 -7.525 125.913 
  (-0.634) (-.073) (1.433) 
Household Size 124.958 38.250 41.554 
  (-1.268) (1.433) (1.417) 
Age 94.625 13.413 25.391 
  (9.668) (4.201) (10.214) 
Married 2096.500 710.438 604.978 
  (5.821) (6.700) (6.260) 
Spanish Speaking -3083.167 -1404.100 -835.717 
  (-2.188) (-4.101) (-2.163) 
Spanish Speaking * 0.875 6.175 -5.000 
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Income (0.0614) (1.662) (-1.194) 
-85.167 376.825 -72.935 Spanish Speaking * 
College Graduate (-0.068) (1.097) (-.245) 
22.917 8.463 13.196 Spanish Speaking * 
Age (0.744) (1.149) (1.547) 
Price of Ownership -1.000 -1.000 -1.000 
  (-4.591) (-10.358) (-10.759) 
Observations 2000 2000 2000 
 
 
 
*Each column of the table presents results from separate maximum likelihood estimations.  
Note that the Price of Ownership is normalized to -1.  The statistics presented here were 
generated through a probit estimation of ownership on demographics with an inclusion of the 
estimate for the price of ownership.  I then divide through by the absolute value of the price of 
ownership coefficient. The omitted category is a non-Spanish speaking, non-college graduate, 
who is female and not married.  Household income is measured in 1,000s of 1989 dollars. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 This research focuses on the location decision of Spanish-speaking migrants and while recognizing that discrimination in the 
housing and credit markets is likely present to some degree, I do not focus here on such effects. 
2 “Crowded” is defined as more than 1 person per room and “severely crowded” is defined as more than 1.5 persons per room. 
3 All descriptive statistics presented on Santa Ana were taken from the U.S. Census Bureau’s website.  www.census.gov.    
4 John F. Kain.  “Housing Segregation, Negro Employment, and Metropolitan Decentralization.”  The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, Vol. 82, pp. 175-197.  1968.  
5 In their analysis, Chiswick and Miller estimate the return on labor market earnings for a non-fluent immigrant to obtain fluency to 
be 17%-34%.   
6 These connections constitute a unique form of social capital that can provide access to foreign employment opportunities, living 
situations, and cultural support.  (Massey et al., 1994; Mines, 1981). 
7See Massey and Denton (1985). 
8 I also investigated several metropolitan areas within Texas, but chose to focus on California due to its larger migrant pools. 
9 http://www.ipums.org/usa/hgeographic/pumaa.html 
10 See Bajari and Khan (2002) for an in depth description of the methods implemented in this section. 
 
 
11 Lauren Krivo’s analysis of Hispanic households found that it has less of an effect for Hispanics than their Anglo counterparts. 
12 Bajari and Kahn (2002), whose work this paper is closely related to, find in a comparative analysis on blacks and whites that 
blacks consume only .2 to .28 less rooms than whites in their samples.   
13 Note the reflection of observed consumption in Table 3 with the revealed preference results in Table 6. 
14 In general, one can expect that city centers are characterized by a more intense use of land with fewer detached housing 
opportunities. 
15 I choose not to include willingness to pay results for the age of unit as I find that the effects are minimal across demographics. 
